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AT A CROSS-ROAD: ANTI-SAME-SEX MARRIAGE POLICIES AND
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: THE EFFECT OF SAME-SEX
COHABITATION ON ALIMONY PAYMENTS TO AN EX-SPOUSE
JILL BORNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
This Note discusses the effect of post-marital homosexual relation-
ships on the receipt of alimony payments from an ex-spouse. Traditionally,
a court will terminate alimony payments to a recipient-spouse upon evi-
dence of his or her re-marriage or cohabitation with another person.1 The
purpose underlying such termination is to release the payor-spouse from an
obligation to support an ex-spouse who has become fmancially interdepen-
dent with another. 2 More specifically, allowing a recipient-spouse to obtain
simultaneous double-support creates an inequitable situation for the payor-
spouse.3 A new issue relevant to courts' concerns for preserving equity in
alimony disputes is whether same-sex couples fall within the traditional
legal notions of a cohabitating relationship.4 For states that have prohibited
same-sex marriage, it has become problematic whether to grant private
homosexual relationships a legal status analogous to marriage. The resolu-
tion to this problem directly affects whether the payor-spouse in an alimo-
ny-termination dispute may obtain an equitable outcome. This Note
suggests that to preserve the equitable principles underlying alimony-
termination, state legislatures and courts must recognize same-sex cohabi-
tation as a marriage-like relationship.
Part I of this Note first will establish the background to alimony pay-
ments and the underlying principles of equity in terminating support pay-
ments when a dependent ex-spouse cohabits with another person. Next,
* Jill Bornstein received her J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law in May 2009. Prior to law
school, she received her Bachelor of Arts in Legal Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The author would like to thank her family for their continued support and Professor Vincent Samar for
his helpful guidance and suggestions.
1. See Robert Komitor, Note, Alimony Modification: Cohabitation of Ex- Wife with Another Man,
7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471,478-79 (1978).
2. See In re Marriage of Sunday, 820 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
3. See id.




Part I will address the effect of homosexual relationships on traditional
notions of cohabitation and alimony termination. Finally, Part I presents a
categorical approach to understanding the various state interpretations of
cohabitation. Part II of this Note highlights key state-court decisions, each
representative of one of the three categories described from Part I. Lastly,
Part III will critique the various state-court interpretations, while suggest-
ing a workable model for Illinois to adopt that balances equity with social
policy.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Termination ofAlimony and Spousal Support upon Cohabitation as a
Matter of Equity
Alimony constitutes an equitable payment system under which both
spouses may share in the material assets accumulated during the marriage.
5
Implementing a maintenance agreement serves as a balance of equities; the
payor-spouse will continue to support the recipient-spouse unless or until a
determined condition occurs. The recipient's equitable interest is in main-
taining a level of financial stability that was enjoyed during the marriage.
By contrast, the payor's equitable interest is in terminating maintenance
when the recipient is supported by another.
Terminating alimony payments to a recipient-spouse who is cohabitat-
ing with another person purports to preserve equitable interests on behalf of
the payor-spouse. 6 It would be unfair to oblige a former-spouse to contri-
bute to the financial stability of recipient-spouse's cohabitant or paramour.
7
When a payor-spouse seeks to terminate alimony because of cohabitation,
the court first will refer to the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA)
to determine the terms of payment. 8 If the parties intended for cohabitation
to terminate alimony, then the court will weigh the facts of the case to de-
termine whether a cohabitating relationship exists. In the absence of a PSA,
courts will rely on the cohabitation clause of the state's alimony-
modification statute. 9
Whether interpreting statutory language or a PSA, the courts must bal-
ance the recipient-spouse's interests against those of the payor. Maryland,
5. See Konzelman v. Konzelman, 729 A.2d 7, 12 (N.J. 1999).
6. See generally Hall v. Hall, 323 N.E.2d 541, 544-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Va. App. 2007).
9. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174, 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
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for example, uses a multi-factored test to accomplish this objective. 10 The
test considers "(1) establishment of a common residence; (2) long-term
intimate or romantic involvement; (3) shared assets or common bank ac-
counts; (4) joint contribution to household expenses; and (5) recognition of
the relationship by the community."'11 According to the Maryland Supreme
Court, considering a variety of factors ensures that an ex-spouse engaging
in a new de facto marriage does not wrongfully inherit financial support
from two sources. 
12
By looking at the romantic aspects of the cohabitants' relationship, as
well as economic circumstances, states may effectively balance the oppos-
ing equitable interests at stake in spousal maintenance arrangements.
13
Disregarding one of the aspects of a cohabitating relationship may cause a
recipient-spouse to wrongfully lose financial maintenance. 14 For example,
it would be unjust for a court to terminate support for a recipient-spouse
living with a family member, even if they exhibited some financial interde-
pendence. Consequently, deciding whether a cohabitating relationship ex-
ists depends on the particular circumstances of each case. 
15
In contrast to Maryland's multi-factored test, New Jersey's approach
involves comparing post-marital cohabitating relationships to remar-
riage. 16 In Konzelman v. Konzelman, a payor-spouse alleged that his ex-
wife was cohabitating with another male, and requested that the court ter-
minate alimony pursuant to the parties' PSA.17 The recipient-spouse argued
that she was not cohabitating in the manner intended in the PSA because
she was not financially dependent on her partner. 18 Despite the presence of
a PSA, the court looked to the state's alimony-modification statute to de-
termine the intended effect of cohabitation. 19 The plain language of New
Jersey's statute provides for termination of alimony upon a recipient-
spouse's remarriage; it does not mention cohabitation.20 Nevertheless, the
10. See Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540, 547-48 (Md. 1996).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 548.
13. See 27B C.J.S. DIVORCE § 656 (2007).
14. See id.
15. See 24A AM. JUR. 2D DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 749 (West 2008).
16. See Konzelman v. Konzelman, 729 A.2d 7, 12 (N.J. 1999) (using factors such as living to-
gether; intertwined finances; shared living expenses; and recognition of the couple's relationship in
their social and family circle, to terminate alimony); Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 525 S.E.2d 611, 616-618
(Va. App. 2000) (using common residence; intimate or romantic involvement; provision of financial
support; and duration and continuity of relationship as alimony termination factors).
17. Konzelman, 729A.2d at 10.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Id. at 13.
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court interpreted "remarriage" to mean "form[ing] a new bond that elimi-
nates the prior dependency as a matter of law."'21 Thus, provided that the
recipient-spouse's new relationship has all the indicia of marriage, a PSA
calling for termination upon cohabitation is enforceable. 22 Konzelman,
therefore, stands for the proposition that a cohabiting relationship must not
be merely romantic, casual, or social in nature; rather, to have the indicia of
marriage, the cohabitants must be in a stable, permanent, and interdepen-
dent relationship.23
Although Konzelman aimed to preserve equity by analogizing cohabi-
tation to remarriage, it did not explicitly consider the recipient-spouse's
financial interdependence with the third party.24 In this way, New Jersey's
approach is less effective than Maryland's in preserving the equitable bal-
ance.25 On the other hand, courts must be careful not to overvalue the fi-
nancial aspect of cohabitation. The appropriate inquiry is whether the
cohabitating partners "look to each other for support, not whether the sup-
port is in fact adequate to meet the [recipient-spouse's] needs. '26 Conse-
quently, even if the recipient-spouse becomes less affluent by cohabitating
with another person, a court may terminate alimony.
27
The Court of Appeals of Virginia's decision in Pellegrin v. Pellegrin
illustrates another state's approach to defining cohabitation. 28 There, the
court relied on Konzelman and other states' decisions in concluding that
cohabitation does not have an exclusive list of criteria.29 Some possible
factors may include common residence; intimate or romantic involvement;
the provision of financial support; and the duration and continuity of the
relationship. 30 Comparable to the Konzelman analysis, the Pellegrin court
21. Id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:34-25 (West 2000).
22. Konzelman, 729 A.2d at 13-14; see N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:34-25.
23. Konzelman, 729 A.2d at 16. Like Maryland, the court noted some factors indicating cohabita-
tion include living together, joint bank accounts, shared living expenses, division of household chores,
and recognition of the relationship in the couple's social circle. Id. As is relevant to subsequent sections,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted in dicta in Konzelman that, "[c]ohabitation is not defined or
measured solely or even essentially by 'sex' or even by gender." Id. Neither the court nor New Jersey
legislature has explicitly commented on whether cohabitation provisions include private homosexual
relationships, though this dictum seems to suggest that it does.
24. Id. at 12.
25. See id. at 12-13. Importantly, the failure to consider financial circumstances may not be
significant error given that the payor-spouse still carries the burden of proving that the cohabiting
relationship has indicia of a marriage-like relationship. Perhaps the New Jersey Supreme Court pre-
sumed that marriage-like relationships involve financial interdependence.
26. See In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 444 (II1. App. Ct. 1999) (citing In re Mar-
riage of Harzog v. Harzog, 761 S.W.2d 267,268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
27. See Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 444.





did not value any one criterion more than another; rather, it gave deference
to the trial court's evaluation of the facts presented.31 Nevertheless, the
court implied that financial contributions and support play a substantial role
in cohabitation. 32 Ultimately the court determined that mere evidence that
the recipient-spouse received money from her paramour and that the couple
regularly exchanged gifts, did not amount to the "degree of financial inter-
dependence generally associated with marital relationships.
'33
Virginia's approach to defining cohabitation represents the middle-
ground between Maryland and New Jersey. The court looks for particular
indicia of a marriage-like relationship, while also considering the specific
circumstances of each case. 34 Similar to marital-relationships, levels of
intimacy and financial interdependence are unique to every cohabitating
couple. Therefore courts have the burden of weighing the facts of each case
to reach an outcome that will protect the interests of both parties. Because
most states have implemented an equitable law regarding alimony modifi-
cation and cohabitation, cases rarely deal with questions of law. Recently,
however, trends in post-marital homosexual cohabitation have presented
the courts and practitioners with a new legal question to address.
B. Effect of Homosexuals' Controversial Legal Marital Status On
Alimony Modification
The importance of balancing the recipient and payor-spouse's equita-
ble interests sets the groundwork for understanding the effect of private
homosexual relationships on definitions of cohabitation. Recently imposed
federal and state Defense of Marriage Acts ("DOMAs") 35 have led to a
surge of questions concerning the legal rights of homosexuals. 36 Among
the handful of states which have not yet adopted DOMA, same-sex mar-
31. Id. at 617.
32. Id. at 618.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was initiated by President Clinton and was passed by
Congress in 1996. The Act has two sections; one defining marriage as between a man and a woman,
and the other reaffirms the states' own power to define marriage within its boundaries, exempt from the
Full Faith and Credit Clause under Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. In effect,
DOMA allows states to constitutionally refuse to recognize same-sex marriages formalized by another
state. After the federal DOMA was passed, states subsequently adopted their own DOMAs to their
respective state constitutions. Currently, the following states have not adopted DOMAs either as state
law or a legislative amendment: Connecticut; Maryland; Massachusetts; New Jersey; New Mexico;
New York; Rhode Island; Vermont; and Wyoming. Massachusetts is the only state to date that has fully
legalized same-sex marriage. For more insight, see http://www.domawatch.org. (last visited Dec. 9,
2009).
36. See generally MULLER DAVIS & JODY MEYER YAZICI, 12 ILL. PRAC., FAM.L. 750 5/213.1
(2007 ed.).
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riage issues are surfacing in some senate and assembly debates. 37 For ex-
ample, at the time of this writing, a bill before the New York State Senate
proposed an amendment to the state's domestic relations law that would
declare marriage a fundamental human right.38 In effect this bill would
legalize same-sex marriage in New York.39 The bill already passed in the
assembly, and should it pass the senate vote as well, New York will be-
come the second state behind Massachusetts to recognize same-sex mar-
riage.40 This bill would impact New York's domestic relations law
tremendously, considering the law currently contains gender-specific lan-
guage in its marriage-dissolution provisions. 41 Although the majority of
states have enacted a constitutional amendment, citizen-imposed initiative,
or federal-based DOMA, the outcome of New York's same-sex marriage
bill will undoubtedly impact the remaining states' views of same-sex mar-
riage.
Aside from implicating equality or constitutional rights for homosex-
uals, state policies on same-sex marriage are also relevant to this Note's
discussion of cohabitation. As illustrated above, a number of states analog-
ize post-marital cohabitation to remarriage for alimony-termination purpos-
es. Whether homosexuals may enter a marriage-like relationship when they
are denied the right to marry relates to equity interests in a post-marital
cohabitation setting.42 On one side of the argument, it could be inconsistent
policy for states to ban same-sex marriage yet recognize same-sex cohabi-
tation. Some legislators may worry that acknowledging that homosexuals
may live in a marriage-like manner will eventually lead to legalizing same-
sex marriage. In effect, states supporting this argument have held that post-
marital homosexual cohabitation will not affect alimony.
On the other hand, refusing to acknowledge same-sex cohabitation
poses a concern for the payor-spouse's interests in a spousal maintenance
dispute. A July 22, 2007, article by Maura Dolan of the Los Angeles Times
37. See Tom Head, States That May Soon Allow Legal Gay Marriages or New Civil Unions,
http://civilliberty.about.com/od/gendersexuality/tp/newgaystates.html. (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
38. 2007 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. A.B. 8590. The bill, in relevant part, states "[a] marriages that is
otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or differ-
ent sex." § 10-A(l). The bill passed the New York Assembly in June of 2007, and has been directed to
the Judiciary Committee by the Senate for further review. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Gay Marriage, a
Touchy Issue, Touches Legislators' Emotions, N.Y. TiMES, June 21, 2007, at B5.
39. Id.; 2007 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. A.B. 8590.
40. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248.
42. Robyn Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Effect of Same-Sex Relationship on Spousal Support, 73
A.L.R. 5th 599 (1999).
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pinpointed this concern. 43 The article covered an Orange County, Califor-
nia court decision that upheld alimony payments to a recipient-spouse,
despite her cohabitation with her registered domestic partner.44 Pursuant to
California state law, a court may terminate alimony payments when the
recipient-spouse dies or remarries, unless otherwise stated in the separation
agreement. 45 Since California does not recognize same-sex marriage, the
court held that same-sex partners cannot cohabitate in a manner analogous
to marriage. 46 Therefore, post-marital same-sex cohabitation was not
grounds to terminate alimony in the state. 47
In a similar case before the Virginia Court of Appeals, same-sex co-
habitation was sufficient to terminate a payor-spouse's alimony obliga-
tions.48 In that case, the parties' PSA provided that the recipient-spouse's
cohabitation with "any person in a situation analogous to marriage" would
be grounds for alimony termination.49 The case hinged on whether the par-
ties intended "any person" to refer only to individuals of the opposite sex,
or Whether it was meant to refer to individuals of either sex. 50 Relying on
Virginia's state policy against same-sex marriage, the trial court deter-
mined that state law would neither recognize that homosexuals could coha-
bit, or "live together in the same house as married persons live together.
'51
Moreover, because the parties drafted the PSA pursuant to Virginia law,
they must have intended for "any person" to refer only to individuals of the
opposite sex. 52 On appeal, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's holding, focusing instead on the language "analogous to
marriage."'53 The court concluded that the word "analogous" implies that
the cohabitation need only resemble a marital relationship. 54 As a result,
although the recipient-spouse and her domestic partner were prohibited
43. Maura Dolan, Same-sex Union Test: Alimony: An Orange County Man Appeals an Order to
Pay Spousal Support to his Ex-Wife, Who is in a Domestic Partnership, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323 (West 2004).
46. Dolan, supra note 43, at 1.
47. Id.
48. Deborah Elkins, Cohabitation with Lesbian Partner Ends Spousal Support Under Couple's
Property Settlement Agreement, VA. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Mar. 5, 2007.
49. Elkins, supra note 48.
50. See Stroud v. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d 142, 145 (Va. App. 2007). Note that intent of the parties is
only at issue when the alimony arrangement was finalized through a Property Settlement Agreement,
rather than a court order.
51. Id. at 148 (citing Schweider v. Schweider, 415 S.E.2d 135, 138 (Va. 1992)).
52. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d at 150-51. The trial court heavily relied on a 1994 opinion of the Virginia
Attorney General which discussed whether same-sex cohabitation was implied in § 18.2-57.2(C) of the
state criminal code. See id., infra note 109.
53. Id. at 151.
54. Id.
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from marrying, their cohabitation did constitute a situation analogous to
marriage. 55 Therefore, the court terminated alimony payments to uphold
equity for the payor-spouse.
56
The contrasting interpretations in the California and Virginia cases de-
scribed above epitomize the relationship between private homosexual rela-
tionships and alimony termination. 57 Precluding homosexuals the ability to
attain legal marital status creates great inconsistency and confusion within
the realm of domestic relations law. Suddenly, courts and practitioners
alike have found themselves on new territory, challenged with interpreting
not only terms of alimony modification orders, but also state policy on
what constitutes a marriage. States like Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Vermont, and Connecticut, which recognize same-sex civil unions, may
more easily terminate alimony upon same-sex cohabitation. 58 However, for
the majority of states that have outlawed civil unions, the decision to im-
pose moral policy on the equitable principles of alimony creates a cros-
sroads.
C. Three Potential Models for Dealing with Same-Sex Cohabitation and
Alimony
Until recently, thirty-four states had not enacted any statute providing
for the modification or termination of spousal support upon cohabitation of
the recipient spouse. 59 However, of those states which do have such provi-
sions, the statutory language fits within one of three broad categories--(a)
ambiguous language; (b) clear language excluding same-sex cohabitation;
and (c) clear language including same-sex cohabitation.
60
The first category includes those states that have ambiguous statutory
language, calling for modification of alimony payments when the recipient
spouse cohabitates with "another person.' '61 In Illinois, for example, a court
may terminate a payor-spouse's support obligations upon proving that the
ex-spouse cohabitates with "another person on a resident, continuing con-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Dolan, supra note 43, at 1; Stroud, 641 S.E.2d at 151.
58. For Massachusetts, see Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968; New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457-A:1 (2007); Vermont, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 chp. 23, § 1201 hist. n. sec 39(a) (2000);
Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38aa to 38bb (2005).
59. Phillip M. Longmeyer, Look on the Bright Side: The Prospect of Modifying or Terminating
Maintenance Obligations upon the Homosexual Cohabitation of Your Former Spouse, 36 BRANDEIS J.
FAM. L. 53, 55 (1997-98).
60. See id. at 56-60.
61. See id. at 56-57.
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jugal basis."' 62 As used in Illinois' statute, "conjugal" refers to a relation-
ship "of or belonging to marriage or the married state."'63 Although sexual
relations or intercourse may suggest a conjugal relationship exists, they are
not a required factor.64 Rather, the better consideration is for the nature and
duration of the relationship.
65
Illinois is representative of those states that clearly recognize cohabita-
tion as a condition to terminate alimony, but whose statutory languages
ambiguously reflect legislative intent.66 The plain meaning of these statutes
alone suggests a broad interpretation of cohabitation, so as to include pri-
vate homosexual relationships. 67 However, analyzing the legislative history
of the statutes and each state's current policy on same-sex marriage may
indicate that the statutes are meant to exclude same-sex cohabitation.
68
Quite bluntly, the Illinois legislature considers same-sex marriage as "ab-
horrent to Illinois public policy." 69 This may in fact indicate that the Illi-
nois legislators did not intend to include homosexuals in the scope of
cohabitating or conjugal relationships. On the other hand, had the legisla-
tors intended to limit the statutory scope, it likely would have used clearer
language. Overall, the valuable lesson for states like Illinois is to use care-
ful drafting and specific language to define statutory boundaries.
The second category of states includes those whose statutory language
explicitly excludes private homosexual relationships from the scope of their
alimony-modification statutes. Of these states, the operative language is
that alimony will be modified or terminated upon cohabitation with a
member of the opposite sex. 70 New York's gender-specific modification
statute is an extreme representation of this category. 71 Under this statute, a
court may modify support "upon proof that the wife is habitually living
62. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009). Although Illinois and other states use the
term "conjugal relationship" as opposed to "cohabitation," the interpretation and effect of such terms
are the same for the purposes of this Note's discussion. See also Longmeyer, supra note 59, at 56-57.
Similarly, Missouri's modification statute considers "the extent to which the reasonable expenses of
either party are, or should be, shared by a spouse or other person with whom he or she cohabits." Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.370(l) (2003).
63. In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Il. 1985).
64. Id. at381-82.
65. Id. at380-81.
66. See, e.g., DeMaria v. DeMaria, 724 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Conn. 1998) (McDonald, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that "living with another person," may include living with a relative or another in a platonic
manner; cohabitation and "living with another person" are not necessarily the same).
67. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.370(1).
68. See, e.g., MULLER DAVIS & JODY MEYER YAZICI, 12 ILL. PRAc., FAM.L. 750 5/213.1 (2007
ed.).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (Supp. 1996); CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2004);
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1999).
71. Id.
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with another man and holding herself out as his wife."' 72 Although other
states' statutes implement gender-neutral language, they nevertheless dis-
regard the payor's interests by only applying it to heterosexual cohabi-
tants.73
Ironically, homosexuals cohabitating in states which prohibit same-
sex marriage and implement narrow alimony-modification statutes, are
from all aspects precluded from enduring one of the burdens of marital
status.74 Gajovski v. Gajovski, a case before the Court of Appeals of Ohio,
epitomizes this concept.75 In that case, an ex-husband filed a petition to
terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife who was living and engaging in
sexual relations with another woman.76 Pursuant to the parties' PSA, ali-
mony payments could be terminated if the ex-wife ever remarried or lived
in a state of concubinage. 77 The court had to decipher the meaning and
scope of "concubinage" as used in the PSA.78 Relying primarily on a 1987
decision from the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, which analyzed "concubi-
nage" from a biblical perspective, the court held that homosexual couples
cannot enter a state of concubinage. 79 Under the court's perspective, "con-
cubinage" describes a relationship in which "two people capable of con-
tracting marriage are involved in an open, illicit sexual relationship
approximating marriage."'80 Because same-sex couples may never attain
marital status in Ohio, the court held that they may neither attain a status
approximating marriage. 81
In his dissent, Justice William Baird criticized the majority's reliance
on a biblically-inspired interpretation of concubinage. 82 Instead, a dictio-
nary definition would have more appropriately characterized the parties'
intended use of the word.83 As cited by Justice Baird, Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, unabridged (1961), defines "concubine" as "a
man living in a state of concubinage to another man or another woman."'8
4
72. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Special Term, Suffolk Cnty.
1985); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 248.
73. See, e.g., Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853, 854 (Ga. 1993); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610
N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
74. See Longmeyer, supra note 59, at 61; see also, e.g., Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d at 433.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 432.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.; In re Succession of Bacot, 502 So.2d 1118, 1127-30 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
80. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d at 432 (citing Bacot, 502 So.2d at 1129) (emphasis omitted).
81. Id. at 433.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (Baird, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, it logically follows that the parties likely intended "in a state of
concubinage" to signify an interdependent living arrangement involving
sexual relations. 85 Explicitly, the underlying purpose of terminating alimo-
ny upon concubinage is to prevent the payor-spouse from supporting the
recipient spouse's paramour. 86 According to Justice Baird, the paramour's
inability to marry the recipient spouse seems beyond the scope of the de-
cree and the parties' intentions.87 Given his recognition of the equitable
considerations underlying alimony payment issues, Justice Baird's dissent
closely resembles the last category of state modification statutes.
The final category of statutory language encompasses those states
which have explicitly expanded their respective modification statutes to
include same-sex cohabitation. 88 North Carolina's alimony termination
statute adequately represents this category of states; it terminates payments
when the supported spouse remarries or engages in cohabitation, regardless
of the genders of the cohabitants. 89 The statute further defines cohabitation
as "the act of two adults dwelling together continuously and habitually in a
private heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is not solemnized
by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship." 90 North Carolina per-
haps best preserves the equitable principles underlying alimony modifica-
tion, as it primarily focuses on the changed financial circumstances of the
recipient spouse.9 1
By comparison, some other states whose statutory language falls with-
in the third category still do not emphasize changed circumstances of the
recipient spouse. For example, Delaware recognizes same-sex cohabitation,
but disregards "whether the relationship confers a financial benefit on the
party receiving alimony. '92 Consequently, while an ex-spouse's income or
financial stability may not have changed, she may lose financial support
from a prior relationship solely upon entering a cohabiting relationship
with another individual.
Arguably, the states within this subset act just as unfairly as those
which explicitly exclude same-sex cohabitation. In effect, the fact that
these states have expanded their statutory language to include same-sex




88. See Longmeyer, supra note 59, at 58-59.
89. See id. at 59-60; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (2000).
90. Id.
91. See id. at § 50-16.9(a); Longmeyer, supra note 59, at 60.
92. DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 1512(g) (2006).
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ry focus remains on the changed circumstances of the recipient spouse. To
uphold the true purpose of alimony and to protect the interests of the payor-
spouse, states should follow a framework similar to that of North Caroli-
na.93 In sum, equity requires states to recognize same-sex cohabitation; but
even more importantly, it requires states to recognize that cohabitation
alone is not dispositive, unless and until the payor-spouse can prove that
the recipient-spouse is financially interdependent with the cohabitating
partner.
II. CASES
This section illustrates two of the three approaches to alimony termi-
nation by closely looking at cases from representative states. The first set of
cases represents those states which interpreted ambiguous language, either
from a PSA or state statute, broadly to include same-sex cohabitation for
purpose of terminating or modifying alimony payments. Arguably, these
cases have best preserved a payor-spouse's equitable interests. The second
set of cases represents those states which have refused to recognize same-
sex relationships as a means to terminate or modify alimony. As a result,
these states failed to appreciate the equitable interests at stake. For the pur-
poses of this Note, whether the court interpreted a state statute or privately-
constructed PSA is not dispositive. Rather, the focus is whether the court
applied a broad or narrow view of cohabitation, thereby either preserving
or undervaluing the equitable principles integral to alimony modification.
A. "Private Homosexual Relationships " Interpreted to be within Statuto-
ry or PSA Language
i. Utah
In Garcia v. Garcia, a payor-spouse petitioned the court under Utah's
alimony modification statute to terminate support to his former wife who
was allegedly cohabitating with another woman.94 The plain language of
the statute provides that alimony shall terminate "upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with anoth-
er person.' '95 The inherent ambiguity of "another person" left open the is-
sue whether same-sex cohabitation qualified to terminate support. The trial
93. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
94. Garcia v. Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174, 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-59(10)
(2004).
95. Id.; see also Garcia, 60 P.3d at 1175.
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court narrowly interpreted the statute to apply only to heterosexual couples,
based on Utah's prohibition of same-sex marriage. 96 However, the Court of
Appeals of Utah reversed the trial court's holding and found same-sex co-
habitation did fall within the statute's scope. 97
Not only did Garcia broaden cohabitation to include homosexual rela-
tionships, but it also set forth a two-part test to determine whether a cohabi-
tating relationship exists.98 The test looks for (a) common residency and (b)
sexual contact evidencing conjugal association.99 Presumably, the purpose
of requiring both factors is to avoid terminating alimony when the reci-
pient-spouse merely lives with a roommate, family member, or friend. To
determine whether the second factor included same-sex couples, the court
looked to the plain meaning of Utah's alimony modification statute and to
previous cohabitation cases. 100 First, because the legislature did not specify
that cohabitation exists only between two people of the opposite sex, the
court determined that the second part of the test could apply to same-sex
couples. 101 Next the court considered Haddow v. Haddow, which held that
conjugal associations, as used in the cohabitation context, only applied to
heterosexual couples. 102 Disagreeing with this interpretation, the court in
Garcia broadened the scope of conjugal association to encompass same-sex
sexual contact. 103
ii. Virginia
In a 2007 decision, Stroud v. Stroud, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
expanded its interpretation of cohabitation to include same-sex couples.
104
In that case, a payor-spouse requested alimony termination upon discover-
ing that his ex-wife was cohabitating with another woman. 105 Under the
terms of the parties' PSA, spousal support shall terminate "upon the remar-
riage of [w]ife and/or her cohabitation with any person to whom she is not
related by blood or marriage in a situation analogous to marriage." 106 The





100. Id.; see also Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985).
101. See Garcia, 60 P.3d at 1176.
102. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672.
103. Garcia, 60 P.3d at 1176.
104. Stroud, 641 S.E.2d at 151.
105. Id. at 145.
106. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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cluded that as a matter of law individuals of the same sex cannot cohabit.1
07
The court primarily relied on a 1994 Opinion written by the Attorney Gen-
eral of Virginia.108 There, the Attorney General interpreted a section of the
criminal code referring to cohabitation of a defendant and a victim in a
domestic relations dispute. 10 9 The code classifies assault or battery of a
"family or household member" as a Class 1 misdemeanor. 10 A subsequent
section of the code defines, in relevant part, a family or household member
as "any individual who cohabits or who, within the previous twelve
months, cohabited with the defendant." 1 I The Attorney General relied on
Virginia's prohibition of same-sex marriage as well as the customary legal
usage of "cohabits," which refers to a couple living together as husband
and wife. 112 These factors led the Attorney General to believe that the rele-
vant section of the code only applied to heterosexual cohabitation.113
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia criticized the trial court's
reliance on the Attorney General's Opinion, considering the fact that
Stroud required interpretation of a private contract rather than legislative
intent. 114 The parties' PSA contained the phrase "analogous to marriage;"
the court interpreted "analogous" broadly and held that same-sex couples
could cohabitate in a manner analogous to marriage. 115 Furthermore, the
court in Stroud considered five factors indicative of cohabitation. 116 The
factors included (1) common residence; (2) intimate or romantic involve-
ment; (3) provision of financial support; (4) duration and continuity of the
relationship; and (5) other indicia of permanency. 117 Therefore, if an analy-
sis of the five factors shows that an ex-spouse is cohabitating with another
individual, the court may terminate alimony. 118 Given the PSA language
and the cohabitating nature of the recipient-spouse's relationship with her
domestic partner, the court justified terminating spousal maintenance. 119
107. Id. at 150-51.
108. Id. (citing 60 Op. Att'y Gen. Va. 1 (1994)).
109. 60 Op. Att'y Gen. Va. 1 (1994); see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(A) (West 2001).
110. 60 Op. Att'y Gen. Va. 1 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(A).
Ill. Id. at § 18.2-57.2(D).
112. 60 Op. Att'y Gen. Va. 3 (1994).
113. Id. at 4-5.
114. Stroud, 641 S.E.2dat 150-51.
115. Id. at 151 (holding that "analogous to marriage" only means similar in some way, but not
identical in form or substance).
116. Id. at 148-150.
117. Id.





In Vasquez v. Hawthorne, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
neither the "legality" of the relationship between the parties, nor the sexual
orientation of the parties should limit claims based on equitable prin-
ciples. 120 That case involved a dispute between the decedent's estate and
the decedent's alleged homosexual partner.121 According to the trial court,
the partner provided sufficient evidence that he and the decedent enjoyed
such a meretricious relationship, and therefore deserved an equitable divi-
sion of the decedent's assets against the estate. 122 The key issue in Vasquez
was whether a homosexual partner could rely on the equitable doctrine of
"meretricious relationship." 23 Typically, the doctrine provides that proper-
ty acquired during and resulting from a long-term, stable, cohabiting rela-
tionship may be considered the joint property of the parties involved. 124
The trial court interpreted the doctrine and cohabitation broadly, holding
that same-sex partners may engage in a meretricious relationship. 25 On
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals of Washington determined that
same-sex partners cannot enter a meretricious relationship or achieve ma-
rital-like status because they cannot legally wed.126 In spite of this reason-
ing of the lower court, the Supreme Court of Washington vacated the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for a new trial.127
Although the main issue in Vasquez does not involve alimony modifi-
cation, the procedural history is useful for determining whether same-sex
relationships may be analogous to marriage. 128 The state supreme court
recognized that the partner's claims were based on equitable principles;
therefore the outcome should not have depended on the legality of his rela-
tionship with the decedent. 129 Moreover, the court relied on previous cases,
which had interpreted "marital-like" and "meretricious relationship" to be
mere analogies to marriage. Because the court had never before found a
marital-like relationship to be identical to marriage, doing so in Vasquez
120. Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 737-38 (Wash. 2001). It should be noted that the state of
Washington does not have a statute specifically pertaining to alimony modification upon cohabitation of
the recipient spouse. Rather, Washington's most relevant statute calls for modification or termination of
spousal maintenance upon a "substantial change in circumstances." RCW 26.09.170(1).
121. Vasquez, 33 P.3d at 736.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 737-38.
125. Id. at 737.
126. Id. at 736.
127. Id. (ruling that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment when a question of material
fact still existed, and therefore the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the merits).
128. See generally id. at 736.
129. Id. at 737-38.
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would contradict principles of equity. 130 Although Vasquez was ultimately
remanded for a new trial, the supreme court still recognized the injustice in
excluding homosexuals from the ability to engage in a meretricious rela-
tionship.
In his concurrence, Justice Richard B. Sanders criticized the majority
for underemphasizing that the ability to wed is a requisite for a meretri-
cious relationship. 13 1 Because Washington only recognizes marriage be-
tween partners of the opposite sex, only heterosexual couples may live in a
state of cohabitation or engage in a meretricious relationship. 132 Presuma-
bly, to Justice Sanders "marital-like" refers to a heterosexual couple who
has the ability to marry, but which has chosen not wed. In Vasquez, be-
cause the partner and the decedent were of the same sex, they could have
never been in a meretricious or cohabiting relationship under the law.
133
Consequently, the partner was never entitled to equitable relief and all
property in question belonged to the decedent's estate.
1 34
B. Same-Sex Relationships Interpreted to be Outside Scope of Statutory
or PSA Language
i. Georgia
In Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the
trial court's ruling that homosexual cohabitation was within the scope of
Georgia's modification statute. 135 Pursuant to the statutory language, ali-
mony may be terminated or modified when a former spouse is voluntarily
cohabitating in a meretricious relationship. 136 Throughout the statute, "co-
habitation" means "dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretri-
cious relationship with a person of the opposite sex."137 Given the statute's
clear language, the supreme court held that the trial court erred by expand-
ing "meretricious relationship" to include private homosexual relation-
ships.138 According to the court, had the legislature intended the statute to
130. Id. at 738.
131. Id. at 740 (Sanders, J. concurring).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 741.
135. 425 S.E.2d 853, 854 (Ga. 1993).
136. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (1993).
137. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 854; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b).
138. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 854.
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disregard the sexual orientation of the cohabitants, it would have so indi-
cated by the statutory language. 139
Interestingly, Justice Leah J. Sears-Collins' concurring opinion in Van
Dyck implied that the majority opinion may have been based on preserving
homosexual equality more than principles of equity.140 In her opinion, Jus-
tice Sears-Collins emphasized the injustice that same-sex couples endure
by being denied many legal rights awarded to married couples. 141 Specifi-
cally, she noted that while alimony ideally should be based on a recipient-
spouse's financial need, expanding the Georgia statute to include same-sex
couples would impose on them a burden of marital-status without awarding
them any of the benefits of marriage.142 Because cohabitating heterosexual
couples have the choice of taking advantage of the benefits of marriage,
they justifiably must accept the burden of alimony modification upon co-
habitation. 143 Conversely, because homosexual couples are legally forbid-
den to enjoy the benefits of marriage, they will never be similarly situated
to unwed, cohabitating heterosexual couples. 144 As a result, it would be
unfair to subject cohabitating homosexual couples to the burden of mod-
ified alimony payments, without first granting them the option of getting
married. 14 5
ii. New York
In Pattberg v. Pattberg, a payor-spouse challenged New York's ali-
mony modification statute on grounds that its gender-specific language
discriminated against her because she was female. 146 New York's statute
gives the court discretion to modify support payments upon showing that
an ex-wife is (a) habitually living with another man and (b) holding herself
out as the wife of said man. 147 The first element contains three sub-parts,
each of which is weighed based on the particular facts of the case. First,
139. Id. at 854-55.
140. Id. at 855.
141. Id. For example, the right to create a marital life estate trust, to claim family partnership tax
income, to recover damages based on injury to a partner, to receive survivor's benefits, or to enter





146. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d 251, 252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Special Term, Suffolk Cnty.
1985); N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 248.
147. Pattberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 252. Notably, these two elements have proven problematic and
controversial for New York courts.
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"habitually" is determined by the duration of the new relationship. 148
Second, "living with" involves something more than being traditional
roommates or housemates. 149 Lastly, the ex-spouse must be engaging in a
sexual relationship with the man with whom she is habitually living.
150
Because this case implicated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Supreme Court of New York first reviewed wheth-
er the right to cohabit and assert a martial status was a fundamental right in
the context of the state's alimony modification statute. 151 This required the
court to ascertain the appropriate level of scrutiny for an alleged gender-
based equal protection violation.1 52 "The success of a constitutional chal-
lenge to New York's termination-of-alimony statute on Equal Protection
grounds will depend of [sic] the level of scrutiny the reviewing court
chooses to apply to the classification established by the statute." 153 Apply-
ing strict scrutiny review would require the court to fmd the statute serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to furthering that inter-
est. 154 The court rejected this argument, however, because the United
States Supreme Court had not yet recognized a fundamental interest in
cohabiting with another person of the opposite sex, much less whether sex-
ual preference is a dispositive factor in cohabitation cases. 155 Absent a
fundamental interest, the court instead decided to apply the less strict ra-
tional basis review, requiring that the statute be only a "rational means to
[serving] a legitimate [s]tate objective."' 156 Upon considering the statute's
legislative history and other jurisdictions' alimony modification statutes,
the court concluded that the law passed rational basis review. 157
Despite the statute's constitutionality, however, the court strongly op-
posed its language and practical effect on alimony modification. 158 Specifi-
cally, the court criticized that requiring unmarried couples to hold
themselves out in public as a married couple missed the true purpose of
alimony modification. 159 Rather, alimony modification should be based on
148. Id. Although no set time minimum has been established, "intermittent intimacy" or merely
spending the nights or weekends with another man will not qualify.
149. Id. at 253.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 252; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. Pattberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 254.
153. Id. "Equal protection" demands that no State shall deprive any person of the equal protection
of the laws; "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Id.
154. See id. at 254.
155. Id. at 255-56.
156. Id. at 256.
157. Id. at256-57.




the economic need of the recipient-spouse; justice provides that once a
recipient-spouse is being supported by another, a payor-spouse should have
grounds to modify or terminate spousal support. 160 Thus, whereas the New
York statute may have been declared constitutional with regards to equal
protection, it also "[left] the courts powerless to relieve the former husband
of [his] obligations of subsidizing his former wife's affairs no matter how
unfair this may [have been] under the circumstances." 161 Consequently, the
court in Pattberg strongly advised the legislature to amend the law into a
workable statute. 162
Interestingly, however, even though homosexual cohabitation was not
at issue in this case, the court explicitly stated in dicta that the statute "spe-
cifically refers to a heterosexual relationship" and that "allegations of an
ex-wife's homosexual relationship cannot provide a basis for [alimony
termination]."1 63 As a result, although the court seemingly intended to
render an equitable, gender-neutral decision, it undermined its own objec-
tives by limiting the statute to heterosexual cohabitating couples. 
164
III. ANALYSIS
As illustrated by the case-by-case analysis above, determining whether
same-sex cohabitation should qualify to terminate or modify alimony pay-
ments to a recipient-spouse is a complex area of law. That statutory lan-
guage, moral policy, and definitions of "cohabitation" vary from state to
state only further complicates this issue. To simplify the matter, the issue
should be broken down into two key concepts. First, state legislatures must
act to account for private homosexual relationships in their respective ali-
mony modification statutes; failing to do so undermines the importance of
equity in awarding spousal support to an ex-spouse in the first place.
Second, in addition to legislative action, state judiciaries must design a
clear set of indicia to determine whether a cohabitating relationship exists
between the recipient-spouse and a third party. To ensure fairness to the
recipient-spouse, the indicia should include at least some consideration for
the financial interdependence of the cohabitating couple. For states that
currently have ambiguous statutory language or have excluded private ho-
mosexual relationships, action from the respective legislature and judiciary
160. Id. at 258.
161. Id. (quoting J. Wachtler's dissenting opinion in Northrup v. Northrup, 384 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976), rev'd 43 N.Y.2d 566 (1978)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 253.
164. See id.
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is necessary to maintain an equitable balance between the payor and reci-
pient spouse.
The following analysis section first will dissect the specific errors of
states which do not recognize same-sex cohabitation, and some of the prob-
lems associated with definitions of cohabitation that focus solely on the
intimacy of the cohabitating parties. Then, it will set forth a workable mod-
el for Illinois to adopt to guarantee a payor-spouse's interests are protected
in every alimony modification case.
A. The Unjust Inconsistency of States Which Do Not Recognize Same-Sex
Cohabitation
States which fail to recognize same-sex cohabitation for purpose of
modifying or terminating alimony payments, regardless of their policies on
same-sex marriage, effectively diminish the equitable principles underlying
spousal support. The Supreme Court of Georgia's opinion in Van Dyck and
the Supreme Court of New York's opinion in Pattberg are prime examples
of this phenomenon.165
In Van Dyck, the majority refused to terminate alimony payments to a
recipient-spouse in spite of the fact that she was cohabitating with another
woman. 166 The court based its reasoning on the plain language of the sta-
tute, and found that the trial court erred by inferring a broad and inexplicit
legislative intent. 167 As implied by Justice Sears-Collins' concurring opi-
nion, the Van Dyck court considered equality issues for homosexuals in its
deliberation. 168 Specifically, they reasoned that private homosexual rela-
tionships are equivalent to unformalized heterosexual relationships because
the heterosexual couple will always have the option of marriage.169 How-
ever, this reasoning fails to preserve equitable justice for the payor-spouse
because it overlooks the fact that private homosexual couples, like unwed
heterosexuals, may still exude a sense of permanency in their relationship.
When a couple financially invests in their relationship, it likely indicates
they intend to commit to and depend on each other. Because both homo-
sexual and heterosexual couples alike become financially interdependent,
homosexuals' inability to marry is immaterial. While it remains unfair that
same-sex couples may suffer a burden of marriage without being able to
165. See generally Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853, 854 (Ga. 1993) (holding that the state
modification statute does not extend to meretricious relationships between individuals of the same sex);
Pattberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.
166. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 854.
167. Id. at 854-855.




reap any of the benefits, the financial consequences to payor-spouse by
continuing alimony are much worse in terms of equity. Plainly, a payor-
spouse should not be obligated to continue to support an ex-spouse if that
spouse has become financially interdependent with a third party, regardless
of that party's gender.
As compared to Van Dyck, the Supreme Court of New York's deci-
sion in Pattberg represents an even more disconcerting perspective on co-
habitation. 170 Despite the court's intent in Pattberg to promote a neutral
alimony modification system--one based on the economic needs of the
recipient-spouse rather than moral policy-it ironically advocated for one
substantially shy of its goal. The court directly advised the state legislature
to eliminate the gender-specific statutory language, thereby relying more
on economic and financial factors to determine alimony modification.
171
Additionally, however, the court unequivocally excluded same-sex cohabi-
tation from the statute's purview. 172 By refusing to extend New York's
modification statute to same-sex cohabitation, Pattberg rendered an incon-
sistent decision. 173 Although the court's primary objective may have been
for the statute to cover male recipient-spouses, limiting the scope of the
statute to heterosexual cohabitation undermined the court's broader objec-
tive in preserving equity for the payor. In effect, unless the New York leg-
islature responds to Pattberg by explicitly including private homosexual
relationships in its modification statute, the payor-spouse's equitable inter-
ests will not be completely preserved. Pattberg's internal contradiction
represents the cross-road between equity and anti-same-sex marriage poli-
cies; here they simply were not reconciled.
Another one of New York's errors is its excessive reliance on the sex-
ual intimacy of the cohabitating partners' relationship. 174 While intimacy is
a significant indicator of cohabitation or a marriage-like relationship, it
must be supported by additional indicia of financial interdependence. Be-
cause maintenance is predicated on recipient-spouse's need for financial
support, the financial implications of the new relationship are the most
relevant to determining that spouse's continued need for maintenance-
"not the presence or absence of sex."' 175 This issue arose in In re Marriage
170. Patberg, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 253, 258; see generally Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 855.
171. Pattberg,497N.Y.S.2dat258-59.
172. Id. at 253.
173. Id.
174. Id. (stating that "[t]he ex-wife must also have a sexual relationship with the man with whom
she is living.")
175. In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 443 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (citing In re Marriage
of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376 (111. 1985)).
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of Sappington when a payor-spouse petitioned the court to terminate ali-
mony payments to his ex-wife because she was allegedly cohabitating with
another man on a resident, conjugal basis. 176 The ex-wife contended that
she was not in a conjugal relationship with the other man because he was
impotent, and there was no evidence that the two had sexual intercourse.
177
Ultimately the court terminated maintenance to the ex-wife, finding that
people cohabitating on a conjugal basis do not necessarily have to engage
in sexual relations and that her relationship with the third party had suffi-
cient indicia of a conjugal relationship. 178 Had the court concluded that a
conjugal relationship requires proof of sexual relations, it would have ren-
dered an inequitable decision that favored the recipient-spouse; the ex-wife
would have wrongfully continued to receive alimony from the petitioner
while simultaneously receiving financial support from another person.
On the other hand, eliminating all considerations for intimacy and
sexual relations could wrongfully favor the payor's equitable interests. For
instance, assume a recipient-spouse moved in with a family member, shar-
ing a common residence and some household expenses. If a court did not
take intimacy into consideration at all, it may mistakenly terminate main-
tenance upon concluding that the recipient-spouse was cohabitating in a
conjugal relationship with another person. In sum, to adequately protect
both the recipient and payor-spouses in cohabitation cases, the court must
scrutinize the conjugal relationship using factors related to both intimacy
and permanency.
B. A Suggestion for Illinois To Create A Workable Statute that Actually
Preserves Principles of Equity
Currently, Illinois' alimony modification statute has ambiguous statu-
tory language. 179 The statute does not explicitly include private homosex-
ual relationships, but rather provides for alimony termination when a
payor-spouse proves that the recipient spouse is "engaged in a resident,
continuing, conjugal relationship with a third party."'1 80 Despite the lan-
guage's ambiguity, the purpose is well-defined-to remedy the inequity
created when the recipient spouse engages in an un-formalized de facto
marriage, to continue to receive alimony from his or her ex-spouse. 181 To
176. Sappington, 478 N.E.2d at 377.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 379.
179. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009).
180. In re Marriage of Sunday, 820 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2002)).
181. Sunday, 820 N.E.2d at 640.
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prove a conjugal relationship exists, the payor-spouse must show the other
ex-spouse is involved in a "de facto husband and wife relationship with a
third party."'1 82 Consideration of the following six factors may assist the
court to determine the significance of the recipient spouse's new relation-
ship: "(1) the length of the relationship; (2) the amount of time the couple
spends together; (3) the nature of the activities engaged in; (4) the interrela-
tion of their personal affairs; (5) whether they vacation together; and (6)
whether they spend holidays together."'
83
Illinois' approach to alimony termination renders two main concerns:
(1) the failure to explicitly acknowledge that private homosexual relation-
ships fall within the scope of a de facto marriage; and (2) the failure to
consider financial interdependence as a factor of a conjugal relationship.
The first concern is an issue to be addressed by the Illinois legislature, whe-
reas the second must be addressed by the courts. To create an alimony
modification statute that effectively balances the equitable interests of the
payor-spouse against the financial concerns for the recipient-spouse, both
branches of government must act on these concerns.
i. Illinois Legislature Should Amend the Statutory Language to Include
Private Homosexual Relationships
The first concern with Illinois' current approach to alimony termina-
tion is its ambiguous statutory language. 184 To resolve this concern, the
legislature should explicitly include private homosexual relationships in the
statute's definition of de facto marriage. 185 In terms of clarity, North Caro-
lina's alimony termination statute is the best example for Illinois to follow;
it defines cohabitation as "two adults living continuously and habitually in
a private heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is not solem-
nized by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship."', 86 Although Illi-
nois' statute refers to a conjugal relationship rather than a cohabiting one,
this distinction will not affect the desired goal.
Given that Illinois is a state which has adopted its own DOMA, some
legislators may contest that recognizing homosexual conjugal relationships
for alimony-termination purposes contradicts state policy.' 8 7 This argument
is without merit for two key reasons. First, according to In re Marriage of
Weisbruch, a 1999 case of first impression brought before the second dis-
182. Id. (emphasis in original).
183. Id.
184. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/510(c) (West 2009).
185. See id.
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
187. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a)(5) (West 2009).
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trict Appellate Court of Illinois, same-sex relationships fall within the sta-
tute's reference to "conjugal" relationships. 188 Second, other states which
join Illinois in prohibiting same-sex marriage still acknowledge same-sex
cohabitation or de facto marriages for alimony termination purposes. 189
Therefore, all political and moral views of same-sex marriage aside, it
makes legal and equitable sense for Illinois to include private homosexual
relationships in the statute's scope.
Weisbruch set a powerful tone for Illinois state policy on both same-
sex relationships and alimony termination. In that case, a payor-spouse
petitioned the court to terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife who
allegedly was engaged in a conjugal relationship with another woman. 190
The trial court held for the payor-spouse, reasoning that homosexual rela-
tionships fall within the definition of "conjugal" and that the recipient-
spouse was engaged in such a relationship. 191 On appeal, the recipient-
spouse contested both findings. 192 Interestingly, one of the arguments the
recipient-spouse made to the court was that her relationship with the other
woman could not be conjugal because of Illinois' policy against same-sex
marriage. 193 By making this argument, the recipient-spouse, presumably a
lesbian, was advocating for a policy decision contrary to her own life-
style. 194 The inherent contradiction in this argument epitomizes one of the
consequences of outlawing same-sex marriage. By enforcing the disparity
between heterosexual and homosexual couples' right to marry, courts only
complicate other areas of the law.
On the other hand, when cases like Weisbruch arise the court has an
opportunity to address the ramifications of anti-same-sex marriage legisla-
tion in the most equitable way possible. In that case, the court upheld the
trial court's conclusions that same-sex relationships may be considered
conjugal within the statutory language; that holding reaffirmed that the true
purpose of alimony termination is to prevent injustice to the payor-spouse
when the recipient-spouse uses the money to support a third party or has
188. See In re Marriage of Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d 439, 445 (111. App. Ct. 1999).
189. Some examples include North Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-





193. Id. at 443; see also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/213.1 (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/212(a)(5) (West 2009).
194. Of course, one may presume that the recipient-spouse in Weisbruch and others in a similarly
situated position would rather see same-sex marriage become legal; even if that resulted in more certain
termination of maintenance payments. However, the way anti-same-sex marriage policy currently
exists, homosexuals are compelled to argue against their own marital rights on the alimony issue.
[Vol 84:3
ATA CROSS-ROAD
become financially interdependent with another person. 195 Moreover,
courts should aim to further this purpose regardless of the gender of the
third party, and in spite of the fact that Illinois prohibits same-sex marriag-
es. 1
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As significant as the Weisbruch decision was for Illinois' alimony-
termination policy, the Illinois legislature should still formally amend the
statutory language to explicitly include private homosexual relationships.
At the time of writing this Note, Weisbruch has not been overruled, but
neither have similar cases been brought before the courts. Without legisla-
tive action, Weisbruch stands to be changed, or even rejected. Changing the
statutory language not only would clarify legislative intent for the scope of
conjugal relationships, but it also would ensure that the equitable interests
of the payor-spouse are protected regardless of the gender of the third par-
ty. A possible revision of the clause pertaining to cohabitation could pro-
vide for termination "if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with
another person, of either the same or opposite sex, on a resident, continuing
conjugal basis."'197 Another option would be to strike the current statutory
language altogether and instead adopt a version modeled after North Caro-
lina's definition of cohabitation. 198 This approach may involve broadening
the interpretation of conjugal relationship from "de facto husband and wife
relationship" to "private heterosexual relationship, even if not solemnized
by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship."' 99 Whichever approach
the legislature may elect, the purpose must be to clarify the scope of coha-
bitation and conjugal relationship so that same-sex relationships are in-
cluded. To the extent that this purpose is achieved, the legislature will have
resolved the ambiguous language of the current statute.
Significantly, the two concerns for Illinois' alimony termination sta-
tute cannot be resolved by either the judiciary or the legislature alone; to
effectively preserve equitable principles on behalf of the payor-spouse,
action from both branches is necessary. To reiterate, allowing same-sex
couples to achieve equal marital status to heterosexual couples would alle-
viate the alimony modification conflict and, to be sure, many others. How-
ever, unless and until that legislation emerges, the legislature and court
system must work together to further the true purposes of spousal mainten-
195. Weisbruch, 710 N.E.2d at 443-44.
196. Id.
197. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009). Italicized words were added as an example
of possible language to amend the statute.
198. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (defining cohabitation as "the act of two adults dwelling
together continuously and habitually in a private heterosexual relationship, even if this relationship is
not solemnized by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship.").
199. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
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ance. Consideration for the financial interdependence of the cohabiting
couple, as well as explicit language acknowledging same-sex cohabitation
are two ways by which Illinois can meet this goal.
ii. Illinois Courts Should Consider the Financial Interdependence of the
Conjugal Couple
The judiciary's analysis of conjugal relationships slightly resembles
Maryland's multi-factored approach in Gordon.200 Maryland courts consid-
er (1) establishment of a common residence; (2) long-term intimate or ro-
mantic involvement; (3) shared assets or common bank accounts; (4) joint
contribution to household expenses; and (5) recognition of the relationship
by the community."'201 In contrast to Illinois' approach, Maryland's test for
cohabitation focused, in part, on the financial interdependence of cohabitat-
ing couple; whereas Illinois' factors focus solely on the intimacy of the
couple's relationship. 202 Both states share in the spirit of preserving equita-
ble principles on behalf of the payor-spouse; yet, Illinois' approach does
not explicitly consider whether the recipient-spouse's financial circums-
tances have changed. 203
Not only does financial interdependence indicate stability in a rela-
tionship, but it additionally will prevent the courts from terminating alimo-
ny support prematurely. For instance, couples who have a close, intimate
relationship; who travel together; or who regularly spend holidays together
still may not be engaging in a de facto marriage. Unfortunately, Illinois'
current factors would indicate otherwise, potentially causing a recipient-
spouse to lose necessary financial support for engaging in an intimate rela-
tionship with another person. The best suggestion for Illinois courts to re-
work the current model is to include factors that consider the financial in-
terdependence of the cohabitating couple. For example, other states consid-
er whether the couple shares bank accounts, assets, household expenses, or
property.204 When a couple establishes financial interdependence, they
have invested in the relationship and likely intend for the relationship to
continue and prosper.205 Although these factors should not be dispositive of
200. See Gordon v. Gordon, 675 A.2d 540, 547-48 (Md. 1996).
201. See id.
202. Compare Gordon, 675 A.2d at 547-48, with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West
2009). Note that Maryland's alimony termination statute does not explicitly mention cohabitation as a
means to terminate support. See MD. CODE ANN., [FAMILY LAW] § 11-108 (West 2006).
203. See, e.g., Gordon, 675 A.2d at 548; In re Marriage of Sunday, 820 N.E.2d 636, 640 (i11. App.
Ct. 2004).
204. See, e.g., Konzelman v. Konzelman, 729 A.2d 7, 16 (N.J. 1999).




a cohabitating or conjugal relationship, they are critical in preserving the
recipient-spouse's interests. For the courts to do their part to improve Illi-
nois' approach to alimony termination, they should amend the five-factor
analysis by adding factors related to financial interdependence of the coha-
bitating couple.
CONCLUSION
To maintain an equitable balance in alimony-termination disputes,
states should recognize that private homosexual relationships fall within the
meaning of cohabitation. Accomplishing this objective requires courts to
use a broad interpretation of cohabitation, such that the partners live in a
manner analogous to marriage. By considering factors of intimacy and
financial interdependence, courts will ensure that both the recipient and
payor-spouse in an alimony dispute obtain an equitable outcome. Moreo-
ver, state legislatures and practitioners may further prevent an inequitable
outcome in these disputes by using careful drafting and specific language to
designate intent. Putting the foregoing measures in place precludes moral
policies from interfering with matters of equity.
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